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We present an infinitely repeated game model where a
monopolist seller has a contractual obligation with several
buyers in each period. If a contract is violated the buyers
can collect some compensation and impose a penalty on the
seller. The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games
implies that there are an infinite number of subgame perfect
equilibria in this model but we employ a new equilibrium
concept called validated equilibrium that picks out a unique
equilibrium outcome for the game where the seller is able to
dominate the buyers. This model is clearly applicable to
supply problems of Soviet-type economies, but we believe
that it can explain certain phenomena of western economies
as well, in particular it sheds some light on problems of
entry deterrence.
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Section One-Introduction
In centrally planned economies bureaucrats face
tremendous problems in compiling and implementing plans.
Only the most naive and dogmatic textbook accounts of
central planning could conceive of people constructing a
feasible, let alone optimal, plan that is executed by
workers and bureaucrats who need no outside motivation
except their instructions. Particularly serious are the
problems that arise at the implementation phase in the
intermediate product markets. Even if the plan is feasible,
the task of monitoring every single delivery centrally to
make sure that the right amount of the right type of the
right good was delivered to the right factory at the right
time would be a phenomenally expensive task. Deliveries of
intermediate products in the Soviet economy in one year
surely number in the billions' 1
In practice socialist economies employ a sensible
decentralized procedure to minimize the information
processing burden associated with the implementation stage
of planning. The plan defines a set of contracts between
A
. Fedorenko(1985) estimates that their are twenty million
products produced in the industrial sector alone in the
Soviet economy. But even this measure underestimates the
diversity of products because goods are not distinguished
according to when or where they are available. Karpov (1972)
claims that there are about 72,000 different types of ball
bearings produced in the Soviet economy.
buyers and sellers specifying what is to be delivered, when
it is to be delivered etc. . When a contract has been
violated the buyer who has been hurt is supposed to report
the encroachment. The seller is then punished and the buyer
receives some compensation. The scheme induces buyers to
report delinquent sellers while deterring the sellers from
breaching contracts in the first place.
However many analysts have called attention to the weak
performance of the contract enforcement system in socialist
economies. Bornstein writes;
"...these annual contracts are characterized by
widespread violations of 'contract discipline'
,
largely attributable to shortages and sellers'
market conditions, that reduce the effect of
contractual agreements in guiding production and
supply far below the extent intended by PIEM[the
Program to Improve the Economic Mechanism] ....
When contracts are not fulfilled, buyers seldom
file claims for breach of contract, lest they
offend sellers upon whom they will be dependent in
the future. When penalties are levied, their
effect on sellers is weak because the fines are
relatively small and they are paid from profits,
without significant reductions in enterprise
incentive funds or individual bonuses. In turn,
fines provide buyers trivial compensation for
their losses, as they receive only 5% of the
(small) fines with 95% paid to the budget. As a
result, there is a practice of 'mutual amnesty'
under which buyers do not claim compensation for




. See particularly the two excellent papers by Heidi Kroll
in the references.
According to Nove:
"A key factor here, . .
.
, is the sellers' market plus
monopoly. In an economy of shortage, the supplier is
powerful. He can insist on his own terms, knowing that




In this paper we study the issue of the weakness of
contract discipline in situations where a monopolist seller^
is in a long term relationship with some buyers The seller
has a contractual obligation to each buyer in each of an
infinite number of periods. These obligations are very
difficult (maybe impossible) to fulfill.
The main conclusion is that unless there are very
generous rewards offered to buyers for reporting contract
violations the seller will be in a position to intimidate
his buyers so that they do not report contract violations.
However, even though at equilibrium the seller is
persistently violating more contracts than necessary while
the buyers meekly refrain from complaining, the contract
system still plays a valuable role in preventing the seller
3
, .....
. One monopoly supplier is the typical situation in Soviet
industry (see Nove(1977) pp. 42-44 and 113)) although the
recent reforms initiated by General Secretary Gorbachev have
the aim of eliminating most of these monopolies and moving
toward a system of wholesale trade (see Hewitt
( forthcoming) )
.
. One tendency in Soviet reform has been to actually
encourage buyers to develop a long term relationship with
suppliers (see Schroeder (1979) and Bornstein (1985)). The
theory is that then suppliers can specialize in tailoring
their production to the very specific needs of their
customers. Ironically it is the point of this paper that
under these conditions suppliers do anything but tailor
their production to the needs of their customers.
. Levine states that the Soviet economy "has been marked by
a chronic sellers' market; i.e., the situation where demand
is consistently pressing upon supply." See Levine (1959),
page 151. Also see Levine (1966)
.
from breaching even more contracts than would be violated
without the contract system.
To achieve the results we use an infinitely repeated
game model to capture the idea of a long term relationship.
While there is now a large literature on how to model
reputations in finitely repeated games (see Kreps, Wilson,
Milgrom, and Roberts(1982) and Kreps and Wilson(1982) ) we do
not present such results here.
Unfortunately the infinite formulation is plagued by
the problem that almost any feasible payoff vector qualifies
as the equilibrium payoff vector in a perfect equilibrium. 6
So an infinitely repeated game model seems unlikely to
deliver a result of complete seller dominance. Indeed in our
model there can be either buyer or seller dominance at a
perfect equilibrium. However, we are able to introduce a new
equilibrium concept called a validated equilibrium which is
essentially unique and involves seller dominance in this
model
.
We present the model in section two. In section .three
the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games is reviewed
and applied to our game. Section three contains a discussion
of some interesting types of subgame perfect equilibria and
some simple comparative statics are performed. We show that
in the equilibrium where buyers dominate, the behavior of
the seller can be improved only by increasing the penalties
for contract violations. In the equilibrium where the seller
. This is the Folk Theorem (see Abreu (1983) and Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) )
.
dominates, the only way to improve his performance is to
increase the rewards to buyers for reporting contract
violations even though buyers will never report any contract
violations in this equilibrium.
In section five we introduce the validated equilibrium
concept and illustrate it through examples. Section six
presents our main result: that seller dominance is the
essentially unique validated equilibrium of the model. We
also point out how the same arguments can be applied to an
infinitely repeated game of entry to show that entry
deterrence in the unique outcome of the game when there are
a sufficiently large number of potential entrants.
Section seven draws some conclusions and presents some
possibilities for future research.
Section Two-The Model
There are n+1 players in the game: n buyers, B-,,... f B_
indexed by i, and one monopolist seller M. We denote the
strategy spaces of the players in the stage game (the one-
shot game that is repeated) by S1 ,... / S_,SM and the payoff
functions by Pi#»«-/Pn ' pM wn ^ch are functions from n+1-
tuples of strategies to the real numbers.
The structure of the game is particularly simple. First
the seller chooses a number between and n. Call this
number q(sM ) for each sM in SM . This is the number of
contracts he violates. The seller then decides which
contracts to violate i.e. the monopolist picks his victims.
After the seller moves, each victim (a buyer whose contract
has been violated) decides either to report or not report
the violation. We denote the number of reported violations
by r(s l7 . . . ,sn ,sM ) for each possible configuration of
strategies. We do not consider mixed strategies in this
game.
PM (slf . .. / sn/ sM)= w(r(s lf . .. / snf sM))+v(q(sM )) where
w(.) is decreasing and v(.) is increasing. Unpleasant effort
is required for the monopolist to fulfill contracts but it
is bad to be caught violating a contract. The latter can be
true for many reasons. For example, firms or their managers
might be fined for breaking the law and managers might
diminish their chance of promotion by acquiring a reputation
for producing shoddy goods.
For each i,
Pi(s 1; . . . ,sn ,sM)=X if i's contract was fulfilled
=Y if i's contract was violated and i
reported the violation
=Z if i's contract was violated but i
did not report the violation where
X>Y>Z. The idea is that there is some compensation for
reporting contract violations but this compensation is not
so generous that buyers actually prefer their contracts to
be violated so they can collect compensation.
8The stage game is repeated an infinite number of times.
The move of player i in period t is denoted s^t . The history
of the infinite game (supergame) until period t, denoted Ht ,
is given by (s-^, . . . ,8^^, . . . ,s^, . . .
,
sit-i» • " •
'
snl' • * *
'
Snt-1' SM1' • •
*
sMt-l) * In otner words the
history of the supergame up to time t is simply a list of
what every player has done through period t-1.
The strategy of player i in the supergame is given by
functions s^fR^) for t=l,2,... that give a stage game move
as a function of every history of every possible length. The
strategy space for player i is the set of all possible such
sequences of functions. Supergame strategies for the
monopolist are defined in the same way. Denote an
n+1-tuple of supergame strategies by scP=(s* ,...,s* ,Sj£ )
where s^3 = ( s ii/ s i2 (H2^ ' * * * ' sit (Ht^ ' * * * ) ^or eacn i anc*
similarly for sM . Since we never have occasion to discuss
the one-shot game in this paper we will drop *y when we
refer to supergame strategies.
The supergame payoffs are then computed according to
the overtaking criterion which can be explained as follows. 7
Consider two infinite sequences of one-shot payoffs x^. and
yt for t=l,2,... and denote these sequences x and y. Then yT
is preferred to x iff lim £. (y^-x^) >0.
This is not a discounting formulation but we have
checked that all of the qualitative results still hold in
this case. But it is slightly more complicated and we feel
'. See Rubinstein (1979)
.
9that the complications divert attention from the essence of
this paper. Also the results can be proved in the case where
payoffs are expressed according to a limit of means
criterion.
s constitutes a Nash equilibrium iff each strategy s^
i-l r ...,n is a best response to
(s lf . . . , si-i/ si+i» • • > sn' sm) an<* SM ^s a best response to
(s 1 ,...,sn ). In other words if player i assumes that the
other players are playing strategies
(s-^,
. . . / s i-i/ si+i» • • t sn' sM^ ' s i wiH maximize his payoff.
A (subgame) perfect equilibrium has the additional
property that for any history of strategies through time
t-1, H.£, the strategies from t on constitute a Nash
equilibrium. This includes histories that could not occur if
all players are playing the equilibrium strategies.
We will work with a new refinement of the subgame
perfection we call validated equilibria that will be
introduced in section five-
Section Three-Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The so called folk theorem for infinitely repeated
games is well known in game theory (although perhaps not so
widely known generally as to merit its name). To state it
we define the minmax payoff vector as follows. The minmax
•a ;
. . .
. Often we will say perfect equilibrium when we mean
subgame perfect equilibrium.
. Early results on the perfect Folk Theorem were achieved
by Aumann and Shapley (1976) and Rubinstein (1979).
10
payoff for a player in any game is the lowest payoff that
the other players can hold that player at or below. We can
find a player's minmax payoff by ranging over all
combinations of strategies for the other players and then
computing the payoff of the optimal response of the first
player to these combinations. A combination that yields the
lowest payoff to the first player is a minmax combination
and the payoff received by the player is his minmax payoff.
The vector of minmax payoffs is the minmax vector.
Formally let S_^=S 1x . . .xS^_ 1xS^+1 . . .xSM where "x"
denotes cross product. Then s_^eS^ is a minmax strategy for
the players other than i if it solves
min [ max PWs^s.J]. 10
S..6 S-J S;€Si
Theorem One (Perfect Folk Theorem) -A vector of payoffs
is the long run average11 payoff vector of a perfect
equilibrium if it is feasible and strictly pareto dominates
the minmax payoff vector of the one-shot game.
Proof (sketch) -Consider a payoff vector (plf . . ,pn/ pM ) that
strictly dominates the minmax point and supergame strategies
(s^, . .
.
,sn ,sM ) that yield that payoff vector as the long run
average
.
If players play according to (s-i, . . . ,sn ,sM ) a sequence
of game histories, H-^, . . . ,H^, . . . are generated which we will
call the equilibrium path (although we must still show that
this path can be generated at an equilibrium)
.
^T. (s i ,s_ i ) is shorthand for (s1# . . . ,s i _ 1 , *±i*±+i$ . . . ,sM )1
. For an infinite sequence of payoffs xt for €=1,2,... thelong run average is lim^xt/T.
11
We modify the strategies' dependence on history off the
equilibrium path to sustain a perfect equilibrium. For any
history that is off the equilibrium path there must be at
least one player who deviated from (s^, . .
.
,sn ,sM ) to make
that history possible. Choose one such player and have all
the other players join to hold this player down to his
minmax payoff for long enough to wipe out any gain the
player might have achieved from his deviations. 12 The
punishments are enforced by punishing any player who fails
to participate in the same manner. Any player who does not
punish the second deviator is punished and so on in an
infinite regress. After a punishment phase ends the game
proceeds as if the present game history is correct (i.e. the
history that would prevail currently if no deviations had
ever taken place)
.
These strategies will constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium and yield long run average payoffs
(Pit • • • 'Pn'PM) slnce on tne equilibrium path the play of the
game will look like the players were playing (s1# . . .sn ,sM )
.
H
In our game the minmax payoff for the monopolist is
derived by choosing q to maximize PM subject to the
constraint that r=q in every period, i.e. all violations of
contract discipline are reported. 13 For the buyers Y is the
minmax payoff. The set of feasible payoffs in the one shot
TZ
. This is where it is convenient to use the overtaking
criterion.
. The worst thing that can happen to the monopolist is to
have all contract violations reported.
12
game is computed by letting q run between one and n in each
case letting r run from to q. The set of feasible payoffs
is the convex hull 14 of the set of possible payoffs in the
one shot game. It is clear that the set of equilibria is
huge.
Note that in general the folk theorem does not allow us
to sustain payoff vectors that only weakly dominate the
minmax vector. This fact actually causes some technical
difficulties for the analysis that follows.
Section four- Buyers 1 Markets and Sellers' Markets
Although there are an infinite number of equilibria in
our game two types of subgame perfect equilibria are
particularly interesting.
The first equilibrium involves seller dominance of the
buyers. Choose the number c between and 1 such that
cZ+(l-c)X=Y. For each small enough e>0 there will be a
perfect equilibrium where each buyer has his contract
violated exactly 100(c-e)% of the periods and every buyer
never reports that his contract has been violated.
In this equilibrium all the buyers receive a little
more than their minmax payoffs so they can not be pushed
down much further. Note that if Y is increased then c is
decreased, i.e. if the compensation given to buyers for
. Strictly speaking it is only vectors of the convex hull
with rational entries.
. The exception to this is Nash equilibrium with a limit
of means payoff criterion.
13
reporting breaches of contracts is increased than the
frequency of contract violations decreases. Increasing the
penalty leveled at sellers for violating contracts has no
effect on the seller's behavior because this penalty is
never applied in the seller's dominance equilibrium. We are
left with the rather curious conclusion that although
contracts are persistently violated and sellers are never
caught and punished, nevertheless the contract system plays
a useful role in preventing the monopolist's performance
from becoming even worse. Call this equilibrium the
e-seller's market equilibrium.
The second equilibrium involves buyers' dominance. In
this type of equilibrium buyers report all but a tiny
fraction e>0 of contract violations and the seller chooses
the same q in every period that maximizes his utility
subject to r being almost equal to q. Furthermore the
seller's victims in every period t depend only on t. It is
easy to check that this is a Nash equilibrium and it can be
made into a perfect equilibrium by the argument in section
three. Note that raising Y does nothing to improve the
seller's performance at this equilibrium. But seller
performance can be improved by increasing the penalties for
contract violations. Call this equilibrium the e -buyer's
market equilibrium.
Note that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs is open hence the need to introduce the e's above.
14
Section Five-Validated Equilibrium
The existence of both these equilibria demonstrates how
weak the perfect equilibrium concept is in the present
context. The qualitative properties of the two equilibria
could not possibly be more different. While both equilibria
(and mixtures of the two) have a certain plausibility, we
find the seller's market situation the more interesting,
particularly since it is much more consistent with Soviet
reality than the other equilibria. In fact it turns out to
be the essentially unique outcome under our new equilibrium
concept. The rest of this section is devoted to introducing
and illustrating the concept of validated equilibrium.
Consider the normal form of an extensive form game with
n players, strategy spaces S 1 ,...,Sn and payoff functions
P1 ,...,Pn . Suppose that player i announced that he would
play a specific strategy s^ that is part of some subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game. 6 Suppose further that all
the other players believe him provisionally. This
announcement would induce a game, G(s^ ) between N-l players
with strategy spaces S2 , . . . , S_ and payoff functions
P2
,
,...,Pn ' such that Pj^' (s2 , . . . ,sN)=Pi (s 1*,s2 , . . . ,sN ) .
Denote the set of subgame perfect equilibria of this game
SP(G(s^ )). The crucial question we ask is would the
original announcement be a best response to every induced
xo
. We are working with the normal form of an extensive form
game.
15
game Nash equilibrium? If the answer is yes then we consider
the original announcement to be a credible one.
However we wish to apply a slightly weaker notion of
credibility. In particular we stipulate that potential
leaders are punished in some manner if they deviate from
their original announcement. Remember that G(s^ ) is
constructed in such a way that, in general, many nodes left
over from the original extensive form game can not be
reached in the extensive form of G(s^ ) . So if
s_^eSP(G(s^ )) then we can change s_^ all we want on the
nodes that can not be reached given s^ and each such new
strategy will still belong to SP(G(s^ ) ) . We fix a single
outcome from this large set as follows. At any node of the
original extensive form that is impossible to reach given
s^ the players of the induced game play strategies that are
part of the worst subgame perfect equilibrium for player i
in the game with N players that begins at this node. Call
this smaller set of induced game equilibria E(G(s^ )). If
there does not exist a worst subgame perfect equilibrium for
player i then we need to define E(G(s^ , e)) be the set of
induced game equilibria that assign strategies to the
players besides i that are within € of being the worst
subgame perfect equilibrium for i starting at each node that
would be impossible given s^ .
i/
. Of course there may exist many worst perfect equilibrium
outcomes, but the will always exist at least one as long as
the strategy sets are compact and the payoff functions are
continuous.
16
Formally, for a strategy s^ to be self-validating for
player i it must be part of some subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game and it must solve max P^(s^,s_^) for each
5; € Si
s.^ECGtSi*))
We define the value of a self-validating strategy
v(s^ ) as the payoff resulting from the worst induced game
equilibrium. Clearly this is pessimistic conjecture but our
analysis will depend on this assumption. Formally we define
v(s i*)= inf Pi (s i*,s_i ).
S-.eECfcCs*))
For a set of strategies to constitute a validated
equilibrium we will require that the strategies constitute a
subgame perfect equilibrium and that no player has a self-
validating strategy with a payoff strictly higher than the
proposed equilibrium payoff. So we are looking for subgame
perfect equilibria that can not be upset through the actions
of a credible leader.
Formally, (s lr ...,sn ) is a validated equilibrium if it
is a subgame perfect equilibrium and there does not exist a
player i with a self-validating strategy s^ such the
v(si )>Pi(s lf ...,sn )
.
Because the equilibrium set for infinitely repeated
games is open it turns out the we have to employ a slightly
more general concept of e-validated equilibrium in this
paper. First, to define a self-validating strategy we use
the induced game equilibrium set E(G(s^*,e)) rather than
17
E(G(s^ )). Second we assume that players will not block an
equilibrium for very small gains. We say (Si,...,s.) is an
e -validated equilibrium if it is a subgame perfect
equilibrium and there does not exist a player i with a self-
validating strategy s^ such the v(s^) >P^ (s^ . . . ,sn)+e. This
is a sensible concept if there is some small cost attached
to a blocking action.
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1,0 \,X
The unique validated equilibrium of the game is
(down, right) . This is because the unique self-validating
strategy is right for player two. Up is not a self-
validating strategy for player one because player two can
respond optimally with any of his strategies including
mixtures if they are allowed. Up will not be an optimal
response to all of these strategies.
18









In the game below player one chooses the left matrix or
the right matrix, player two chooses up or down and player
















There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (left, up, left)
and (right, down, right) . Only the second is a validated
equilibrium. To verify that (right, down, right) is a
validated equilibrium note that right is a self-validating
strategy for player one -10 since it induces the game,
XE
. It is also true that down is self-validating for two and








which has a unique Nash equilibrium of (down, right) . Given
this induced game equilibrium player one would be satisfied
with his announcement of right. This implies that
(left, up, left) is not a validated equilibrium since it could
1 Qbe blocked by player one.
It is straightfoward but tedious to verify that neither
player two nor player three has a self-validating strategy
with a value higher than five. This is true even allowing
for mixed strategy equilibria and announcements. Therefore
(right, down, right) is a validated equilibrium.
Incidentally it is easy to show that left is not self-
validating for player one. An announcement of left by player









. Player two and player three also can block,
20
This induced game has equilibria (up, left) and (down, right)
.
But if players two and three settle at (down, right) player
one would want to abandon his announcement and play right.
It should be clear from the examples above that in a
two person game a strategy may not be self-validating but it
can become so if the payoffs for the game are perturbed
slightly. This will not be the case in generic games with
more than two players so validated equilibrium is robust in
the sense that small perturbations in payoffs will lead to
small changes in the equilibrium set.
Section Six-Validated Equilibrium of the Repeated Game
We now can state the main result of this paper.
Theorem-Suppose that for some small €>0:
a) the e-sellers 1 market equilibrium in section four is
preferred by the seller to his minmax payoff plus e
:
b) the utility to the seller of violating on average
(c-e+l)n contracts per period and being reported once per
period is higher than the utility of his best response to
being always reported for any transgression by n-1 buyers
with the last buyer always being acquiescent.
Then there exist €-validated equilibria for each e>0
and the seller's long-run average payoff is within e of his
maximum subgame perfect equilibrium long-run average payoff
at each of these e-validated equilibria.
21
Proof-The e-sellers' market equilibrium is a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which buyers never report contract violations
and each has his contract violated in 100 (c-e) percent of
the periods where c satisfies cZ+(l-c)X=Y. The seller
responds to any reported contract violation by minmaxing the
squealer, i.e. violating his contract for enough periods to
to make the buyer regret his transgression. The
essentially -6 u unique equilibrium in the induced game
generated by this strategy involves complete acquiescence by
the buyers. The strategy is self-validating because by
condition a the seller prefers the sellers' market
equilibrium to his minmax payoff plus e which he will
receive forever if he ever deviates from his announcement.
We can conclude that any combination of strategies
where the seller does not receive a long-run average payoff
within e of his maximum subgame perfect equilibrium can not
constitute an €-validated equilibrium. Such a configuration
would be blocked by the seller.
Now note that no buyer has a self-validating strategy.
Proof-Consider any announced strategy by a buyer. There will
always exist an induced game equilibrium where each
remaining buyer has his contract violated (c-e) 100 percent
of the time and they never report violations and the
announcing buyer has his contract violated in every period.
If the seller fails to violate the announcing buyer's
. We need the qualifier essentially because we can obtain
many equilibria by varying the action off the equilibrium
path.
22
contract in a single period all players immediately switch
to reporting all contract violations (minmaxing the seller)
for a sufficient number of periods to make the seller regret
his softness. Assumption b on the seller's preferences
ensures that this outcome is a subgame perfect equilibrium
in the induced game.
There is only one best response for the announcing
buyer to having his contract violated in every period. That
is to always fight so we can conclude that if the original
announcement was self-validating the announced strategy must
have involved fighting all contract violations.
In the above induced game equilibria an announcement to
always fight yields the minmax payoff for the announcing
buyer. This is already sufficient to complete the proof
since we have shown that buyers certainly can not receive
more than their minmax payoffs in the long run through a
blocking action.
But an announcement to always fight is not even self-
validating because any deviation from this announcement
(i.e. not reporting some contract violation) will yield a
long-run average payoff from that point on slightly higher
than the minmax level due to the method of completing
induced game equilibrium strategies when there is no worst
equilibrium payoff for the announcing player.
So the proof is complete.
23
Condition a of the theorem in completely innocuous.
Without it the economic situation would be without interest.
Condition b becomes more likely to be satisfied if there are
many buyers. The intuition flowing from the proof above is
that with many buyers the cost to the monopolist of not
clamping down hard on a single aggressive buyer is very
large because this weakness will turn the other buyers (who
are large in numbers) aggressive.
We now show how the model can be altered to serve as a
theory of entry deterrence. Suppose a firm M will definitely
be in a market for an infinite number of periods. Several
other firms independently take a decision in each period to
be in or to be out. If at least one firm enters in a given
period then the incumbent must decide either to fight or not
to fight. Fighting hurts both the monopolist and any firm
that has entered. Also regardless of whether o\r not he
fights the monopolist always likes to have fewer firms in
the market.
This infinitely repeated game will have equilibria
where all firms enter in every period, equilibria where no
firm ever enters and many equilibria in between. But under
assumptions analogous to a and b in the theorem above at the
essentially unique validated equilibrium no firm ever enters
the market.
Condition b is interesting in this context. It states
that the incumbent would rather engage in a price war every
period with a persistent entrant than to quietly acquiesce
24
in the entry of all the other potential entrants. So the
existence of a plethora of potential competition can
actually encourage monopoly by raising the stakes to the
monopolist of slightly loosening his grip on the market.
Section Seven-Conclusion
The validated equilibrium notion is not the ultimate
solution to the multiplicity problem for repeated games.
However I think it has a certain attractiveness for the game
studied above. It allows a certain type of leadership
pattern to emerge based on the structure of the game without
simply designating one player to be a Stackelberg leader. In
principle any player can become a leader by announcing he
will take a certain course of action but the structure of
the game may render his announcement incredible.
Of course the equilibrium concept has the additional
virtue that it has allowed us to capture and analyze an
important mode of behavior for managers in Soviet-type
economies. The model produces several interesting results.
First, the system of contracts probably is playing a
positive but weak role in disciplining sellers. Second, to
improve the performance of suppliers it seems that the
authorities should focus their attention on increasing
rewards for reporting breaches of contracts rather than
increasing penalties applied to breachers.
25
Some people have concluded based on this model that the
problem of contract enforcement in the Soviet context can be
completely solved by giving rewards for reporting contract
violations that are so generous that the buyers would not
care whether their contracts are satisfied of whether they
are violated but the buyers report the violation. In other
words eliminate the problem by setting Y equal to X. In the
model presented above that would be an effective strategy
but it would be a bad idea in general. This is because if
the court system was unable to distinguish perfectly between
legitimate complaints and false
;
giving overly generous
rewards for contract violations would encourage too much
complaining. While this consideration has been left out of
the model we believe it could be incorporated. This however,
could be a topic for future research.
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